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NOTES
LIABILITY OF THE MASTER FOR THE WILFUL,
WANTON, OR MIALICIOUS ACTS OF HIS
SERVANT IN KENTUCKY
The earlier decisions, both in this country and in England,
laid down the rule that the master is not liable for damages
resulting from the wilful, wanton, or malicious acts of his ser-
vant unless done by his express direction or with his assent, even
though the act was cogimitted within the line of the servant's
duties.'
A Kentucky ease illustrative of the old doctrine may be'
found in the decision of Brasher v. Kennedy,2 handed down in
1849. Brasher, the plaintiff, was the owner of two slaves. The
servant of the defendant, Kennedy, wilfully and with full knowl-
edge of all the circumstances, ferried the slaves across the river
into Ohio to enable them to escape. The defendant's servant
was operating a ferry across the Ohio River at the time and the
act was done in the course of and within the scope of his em-
ployment. The slaves did escape but the master was not held
liable. The court in commenting on the case, said, "The master
is not liable for the wilful acts of his servant committed in the
scope of his employment."
In recent years, however, the law as to this matter has
undergone a marked change and it now seems to be settled that
a master is liable for the wilful and malicious acts of his servant
done in the course of and within the scope of his employment.3
.Lindsay v. Griffin, 22 Ala. 629 (1853); Puryear v. Thompson, 5
Humphrey (Tenn.) 397 (1844); Harris v. Nicholas, 5 Munford (19 Va.)
483 (1817); Cooke v. Illinois Central By. Co., 30 Iowa 202 (1870); Mc-
Manus v. Cricket, 1 East 106, 102 Reprint 43; Turner v. North Beach &
Miss. By. Co., 34 Cal. 594 (1868).
210 B. Monroe, (Ky.) 28 (1849).
3Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co. v. Baden, 122 Ky. 818, 93 S. W. 7
(1906); Williams v. Southern By. Co., 24 Ky. Law Rep. 2214, 73 S. W.
779 (1903); Penn. Iron Works Co. v. Voght Machine Co., 29 Ky. Law
Rep. 861, 96 S. W. 551 (1906); Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Francisco,
149 Ky. 307, 148 S. W. 64 (1912); Lexington Ry. Co. v. Cozine, 23 Ky.
Law Rep. 1137, 64 S. W. 848 (1901).
IAsi mLi." FOR SERVANT'S W pIIUI ACTS
In the case of Chesapeake and Ohio Ry. Co. v. Ford,4 the
servants of the defendants threw boiling water on the plaintiff
from one of the defendant's locomotives, injuring her. The court
in holding the master liable, said: "The master is liable for the
wilful and malicious acts of his servants, where such acts are
done in the course of the employment and within the scope of the
authority of such servant."
In Wilis v. Maysville Ry. Co.,5 a boy standing on a public
street near the railroad track was struck and injured by a piece
of ice kicked from the platform of the caboose of a passing
freight train. The court held that the servant was acting within
the scope of his authority and the company was, therefore, liable.
To say that a servant, in kicking a piece of ice from the plat-
form of the caboose of his master's freight train, is acting within
the scope of his authority and in the line of his duties seems
to be carrying the liability of the master almost to an extreme.
If the servant is not acting in the course of and within the
scope of his employment when the acts complained of are com-
mitted, clearly the master is not liable. Where the servant steps
aside from his employment, even for a very short period, to com-
mit an act not in furtherance of his master's business and which
is in no way incidental to it and where the act is done wilfully
and maliciously to effect some private purpose of his own, the
master cannot be held responsible. 6
In the case of Sullivan v. Louisville dnd Nashvile Ry. Co.,
a member of the defendant's switching crew found a torpedo
and as a prank on the train crew placed it on the rail in front
of the locomotive. The locomotive exploded the torpedo and the
plaintiff, a switchman, was injured. In refusing damages to the
plaintiff the court said: "Where the servant steps aside from
his employment and assumes to act, and does act, solely- on his
own account, in a matter which the master has no more connec-
tion with than if he were the most complete stranger, it would
not be logical and fair to make the master vicariously suffer for
1158 Ky. 800, 166 S. W. 605 (1914).
5122 Ky. 658; 92 S. W. 604 (1906).
P atterson v. Maysville & Big Sandy By. Go., 25 Ky. Law Rep. 1750,
78 S. W. 870 (1904); Mace v. Ashland By. Co., 118 Ky. 885, 82 S. W. 612
(1904); Louisville & Nashvile Ry. Co. v. Routt, 25 Ky. Law Rep. 887,
76 S. W. 513 (1903).
'115 Ky. 447, 74 S. W. 171 (1903).
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it." Such appears to be the general rule and later cases have
adhered tq it. In one of these cases5 a very clear and concise
rule was laid down by the court, namely, "If the servant steps
aside from his master's business, for however short a time, to do
an act not connected with this buqness, the relation of master
and servant is for a time suspended."
Where a servant begins an altercation while acting in the
course of and within the scope of his employment which imme-
diately afterwards is followed by an assault the master will be
held liable, as the law under the circumstances will not under-
take to say when in the course of an asasult the wrong-doer
ceased to act as agent and acted upon his own responsibility. 9
In Wise v. Covington & Cincinnuzti St. Ry. Co.,1o the company
was held liable for an assault by its conductor on a passenger,
committed on the street and after the passenger had left the
car, the court holding that the altercation having comminced in
the car, the assault was merely a continuance of the wrong.
If a servant does an act merely to perpetrate a joke on a
third person and the act is entirely disconnected with the pur-
pose of the employment and is in no way in furtherance of the
master's business, the mazter will not be rendered liable. In the
case of Mace V. Asldand Coal Ry. Co.," a servant of the defend-
ant and the plaintiff were turning back upon the track a coal
car which had been upset. During the course. of the operations,
the servant, wishing to play a joke on the plaintiff, shouted to
him to jump for his life. The plaintiff jumped and was injured.
The company was not held liable as the injury complained of
resulted from the malicious and mischievous act of the servant,
who was not acting in the line of his duty or scope of his author-
ity, or for the purpose of furthering his master's business.
An exception to the general rule that a master is not liable
for the wilful, wanton, or malicious acts of his servant commit-
ted outside the scope of and not within the course of his employ-
ment, may be found in cases where the master entrusts a dan7
gerous instrumentality to the servant. In such cases the master
8Ctincinnat, New Orleans & Texas Pao. Ry. Co. v. Rue, 142 Ky. 694,
134 S. W. 1144 (1918).
9The New EllersZte Fishing Club v. Stewart, 29 Ky. Law Rep. 414,
93 S. W. 598 (1906).
91 KY. 537, 16 S. W. 351 (1891).
S118 Ky. 885, 28 Ky. Law Rep. 865, 82 S. W. 612 (1904).
290'
LIABnaTY oi SE VANT'S WmLUL AcTS
who entrusts the custody, control, and use of any dangerous in-
strumentality to a servant will not be permitted to avoid respon-
sibility fof injuries inflicted thereby through the act of the serv-
ant on the ground that the servant in doing the particular act
complained of was acting outside the scope of his employment
and not in furtherance of his master's business.'2 However, it
is necessary in order to hold the master responsible that the serv-
ant whose acts are complained of shall be the one to whose cus-
tody the article -was confided and that it was permitted to inflict
the injury while in the custody of this servant.13
If the master gives an order to a servant implying the use
of force, the extent and kind of force to be *used being left to the
judgment and discretion of such servant, and if the servant in
carrying out the command makes use of force in a manner or to
a degree which is unjustifiable, the master will be liable.1 4
In Robards v. P. Bannon Sewer Pipe Co.,15 a watchman
employed by the defendants to guard their property mistook
an infant for a wrong-doer and shot and injured him. The
master was forced to respond in damages although the servant
had gone beyond the strict line of his duty or authority, and
inflicted an unjustifiable injury upon tle infant.
"If, however, the servant, under the guise and cover of
executing his master's orders, and exercising the authority con-
ferred upon him, wilfully and. designedly, tor the purpose of
accomplishing his own independent, malicious or wicked pur-
poses, does an injury to another, then the master is not liable.
The relationship of master and servant does not exist between
them.2'
6
Where the master owes to the plaintiff the performance of
some special and particular duty, and confides the perfornance
of that duty to a servant, he will be responsible if the duty is
not performed by that servant. This liability seems to rest more,
"Compare Georgia By. Co. v. Newsome, 60 Ga. 492 (1878), and Mer-
schel v. Louisville & Nashville By. Co., 121 Ky. 620, 85 S. W. 710, 27 Ky.
Law Rep. 465 (1905).
"It will be noticed that this is the ground of distinction between
the case of Mersehel v. Louisville Railway Co., supra, and the case of
Su~livan v. Louisville & Nashville Ry. Go., 115 Ky. 447, 74 S. W. 171,
and the reason for their different holdings.
I4 See Floyd R. Mechem, Agency, Vol. 1, page 1518.
I130 Ky. 380, 113 S. W. 429 (1908)."Floyd R. Mechem in 9 Michigan Law Review at page 100.
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however, on the fact that there is a special duty owing to the
public than upon the doctrine of respo'ndeat superior. This doc-
trine has been very frequently applied in cases of common car-
riers of passengers.1 While such carriers are not insurers of
the safety .of their passengers yet they will be held responsible
if they do not exercie the highest degree of diligence and care to
transport their passengers safely. In the case of Sherley &o. v.
Billings,'5 an officer upon a passenger boat wrongfully assaulted
a pasenger. The court in declaring the company liable, said:
"Common carriers of passengers do not undertake to insure the
safety of those subjecting themselves to thieir control; but the
law holds them to the strictest responsibility for care, vigilance,
and skill on the part of themselves and those employed by
them. "
The doctrine is now well established that the law implies a
contract for the protection of the party carried from the insults
and wanton interference of strangers, fellow passenges, and the
carrier and h6s servants, and for every violation of the implied
contract by force or negligence, the carrier is liable in an action
of contract or tort.19
It is not within the scope of this note to deal with the law
in the other states in regard to this subject. The Kentucky
cases, while not elaborately reasoned, are nevertheless consistent
in result and line up with the great Weight of authority. The
present rules are the product of many years of experience and
may well be defended both. from the standpoint of theory and
of logic. It is the opinion of the writer that the present rules
are the sound ones and that they will continue, with slight modi-
fications, to be the law on the subject for years to come.
ELDRED E. ADAm
1 Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Francisco, 149 Ky. 307, 148 S. W. 46
(1912); Lexington Ry. Co. v. Cozine, 23 Ky. Law Rep. -1137, 64 S. W. 848
(1901); City Transfer Co. v. Robinson, 12 Ky. Law Rep. 555 (1890);
Winnegar's Adnrs v. Central Passenger Ry. Co., 85 Ky. 547, 4 S. W. 237
(1887); Louisville & Xashville Ry. Co. v. Ballard, 85 Ky. 307, 3 S. W. 530
(1887).
199 Bush (Ky.) 147 (1871).
"Addison on Torts, Vol. 1, page 33.
